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Introduction
This paper analyzes optimal long-term financial contracting with a particular focus on the issue of security design. That is, what underlying economic considerations give rise to commonly observed financial contracts like debt, equity, etc.? The scenario we consider involves an agent with a profitable business opportunity who must raise external capital to finance the opportunity. Among an external investor's concerns in funding a business is that the agent who manages the business might divert funds to himself at the expense of the investor. Our analysis incorporates this possibility.
Specifically, in the model, a risk-neutral agent seeks funding from a risk-neutral investor. The funding will finance a business that requires an up-front investment in assets and generates a series of risky cash flows over the next T periods. The agent observes the realizations of these cash flows but the investor does not. The investor must rely on the agent to pay him out of these unobservable cash flows. At any time during the life of the business, control of the assets can be transferred from the agent to the investor. If control is transferred, the agent is left to pursue his best alternative and the investor is free to make optimal use the assets. The threat of losing control is the key to inducing the agent to pay the investor according to the financial contract. A financial contract specifies payments between the agent and the investor and it specifies the circumstances under which control of the project is transferred from the agent to the investor.
Some prior analyses (discussed below) have examined this contracting problem. Our contribution is to fully characterize the optimal contract for the multi-period case with uncertainty. After solving for the contract as an optimal mechanism, we demonstrate that it can be implemented by a combination of long-term coupon debt and a line of credit, two very simple, standard contracts. So we have a theory of long-term debt financing.
The optimal coupon debt and credit line can be described as follows. In each period, the agent faces a fixed charge, principal plus interest -this is the payment on the coupon debt. If a payment is not made, the agent is in default. The credit line is characterized by an interest rate and a credit limit. Payments need not be made on the credit line except for required interest payments once the credit limit is reached; and required payments if the credit limit is reduced. If a required payment is not made, the agent is in default. If the agent is in default, there is some probability that control is transferred to the investor (this probability is increasing in the extent of the default). The agent will make optimal use of the line of credit. If he cannot make a coupon debt payment out of the business cash flow, he will draw on the line of credit. If needed, the agent can continue to draw on the line of credit until it is exhausted. After that, if the agent cannot make a payment, he may lose control. If the business cash flow exceeds the coupon debt payments, then the agent will use the excess cash to pay down the credit line and after that, will dividend himself any remaining cash. Though the agent could draw on the line of credit and simply pay the cash to himself, he will not choose to do so. The optimal credit limit and interest rate will discourage this tactic.
The coupon debt and the line of credit play different roles in implementing the optimal contract. The coupon debt is effective for financing early consumption for the agent (if given the market interest rate the agent's time preferences are such that he prefers early consumption). The line of credit provides the flexibility needed given that the business cash flow is risky. For the case in which the agent's subjective discount rate equals the market interest rate (so the agent does not desire a consumption loan), the optimal financial contract can be implemented with just a line of credit. In this case, the agent funds the up-front investment from the line of credit and then pays it down to zero as soon as possible -there is no further motive for borrowing. For the limiting case in which the business cash flow is riskless, only coupon debt is needed. With no cash flow risk, the fixed payments of coupon debt can simultaneously fund the up-front investment as well as fund the agent's early consumption (if desired).
The threat that induces the agent to pay the investor is that control of the assets can be transferred to the investor. Our modeling here covers a variety of situations of interest. It could involve liquidating the assets, selling them piecemeal at market prices. For this case, a transfer of control involves a payoff for the investor that is exogenous and may vary over the life of the business. Alternatively, a transfer of control could involve the sale of the business as a going concern. Here the sale price, and hence the payoff available from a transfer of control, is endogenous and depends on the remaining life of the business and on the wealth of potential buyers. For if a buyer must finance the purchase too, then we have the same problem again -the price a buyer can pay is determined as part of the solution to the optimal contracting problem. For the agent, a transfer of control may result in his accepting his next best employment alternative. For this case, a transfer of control involves an agent payoff that is exogenous. Alternatively, a transfer of control could result in the agent borrowing to start a new business. Here the agent's payoff following a transfer of control is endogenous and is determined as part of the solution to the optimal contracting problem. After characterizing the optimal contract, we explore these and other interpretations of a transfer of control.
Debt financing is often seen as problematic because of asset-substitution problems. That is, equity-holders may have the incentive to make the firm riskier, thereby transferring wealth from debt-holders. Here, even though the optimal contract involves debt, there is no asset-substitution problem because the agent does not benefit from an increase in cash flow risk. In a given period, while the agent's cash payoff is convex in the business cash flow, the agent's total payoff, cash payoff plus continuation payoff, is linear in the business cash flow -it equals the business cash flow less a constant. The agent's continuation payoff includes expected future cash payments, accounting for the possibility of a transfer of control. As will be seen, this linear payoff follows from the agent's incentive-compatibility constraint.
Our analysis does not include (costly unobservable) effort by the agent. But if the agent must also exert effort, and if maximal effort is first best (as is the case in binary work/shirk moral hazard models), then our optimal contract simultaneously solves the moral hazard problem involving agent effort. This follows from the fact that the optimal contract makes the agent's payoff in a given period equal to the business cash flow less a constant.
Our analysis considers both the case in which the agent and investor can commit to a contract and the case in which contracts can be renegotiated. With the possibility of renegotiation, the contract must be Pareto optimal throughout its life. Otherwise the agent and investor would renegotiate. Of course, the possibility of renegotiation effectively entails more constraints on the contracting problem and hence leads to worse outcomes.
In related work, Diamond (1984) analyzes a one-period model in which the business cash flow is risky and shows that the optimal contract is debt. If the agent defaults he faces a cost that can be interpreted as forfeiting collateral or not being refinanced in the future. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) have a similar contracting problem. Gromb (1999) considers a multi-period model in which the agent requires new financing each period. The threat facing the agent is that future funding will be withheld. It is assumed that each period's business cash flow has a two-state (i.i.d.) distribution. In this setting, Gromb provides a partial characterization of the optimal contract, in particular showing that it may be optimal to provide the agent with slack in the sense that it may take several low payments before his funding is cut off. Gromb does not address security design issues. In terms of the modeling, we assume that the business cash flows are independent over time but beyond that we make no distribution assumptions of consequence. The contracting problems considered in these analyses are special cases of ours. Allen (1983) analyzes a multi-period contracting model in which the agent is financing a riskless business and in which the agent and investor can commit to a contract. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , Hart and Moore (1994), and Hart (1995) analyze financial contracting for settings in which the cash flows are riskless and for which contracts can be renegotiated. The key difference among these analyses is in the way they model renegotiation. The Bulow and Rogoff (1989) model is a special case of ours.
Hart and Moore (1998) introduce risky cash flows into a two-period version of their model, assuming that all uncertainty is resolved immediately after the agent and investor sign a contract. By contrast, in our model the uncertainty is resolved over time. Though given our assumption of independent cash flows across periods, the Hart and Moore (1998) model has a feature that ours lacks -early cash flows convey information about later cash flows. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) also have this possibility.
Renegotiation in Hart (1995) and Hart and Moore (1998) is modeled as a procedure that is exogenously imposed on the contracting problem.
1 In principle, though, a contract could specify an optimal renegotiation procedure; the exogenous one they impose is not necessarily optimal. Harris and Raviv (1995) reconsider (an earlier working paper version of) the Hart and Moore (1998) model. But r ather than exogenously specify a renegotiation procedure, Harris and Raviv solve for the optimal contractual arrangement. With observable but unverifiable states, they show that the optimal contract has the agent and investor simultaneously report the state and the contract depends on the reports.
In all of these analyses, as well as the analysis here, some threat induces the agent to repay the investor. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) consider a sovereign debt setting and so the threat involves the interruption of a country's trade. The other analyses consider private business settings and so the threat involves either a seizure of business assets or a withholding of future funding.
An extensive literature on optimal contracting studies settings in which risk-averse agents receive risky, privately-observed cash flows and seek to share the risk. To mention a few, Green (1987) characterizes the optimal contract in an infinite-horizon model, where in each period, each agent's income has a two-state (i.i.d.) distribution. Townsend (1979) and Mookherjee and Png (1989) analyze one-period models in which a (costly) audit can reveal an agent's income. The audit threat is the key to inducing an agent to truthfully report his income. Wang (1999) combines these ideas, analyzing a special case of Green's model with deterministic auditing (a low income report is certainly audited and a high income report is not). Our analysis does not incorporate risk sharing and we do not have audits. Both would be important extensions.
Section 2 presents the basic model and Section 3 presents an illustrative example. In Section 4, we solve for the optimal financial contract and in Section 5 we show how the optimal contract can be implemented with a combination of long-term coupon debt and a line of credit. Section 6 shows how by varying the specification of terminal payoffs in the event of a transfer of control, we can accommodate a variety of situations of interest and nest some prior analyses of this issue. Section 7 discusses the asset substitution problem and the standard moral hazard problem of privately observed and costly agent effort. Section 8 has concluding remarks. There is a moral hazard problem in that the agent privately observes the project's cash flows. Specifically, at each date t > 0, the agent privately observes the realization of Y t . The investor must rely on the agent to report this realization. Of course, the agent might lie about the cash flow in order to cheat the investor.
The Model
Control of the project can be transferred from the agent to the investor at any time. We refer to this transfer of control as termination. Specifically, after the cash flow Y t is realized, the agent may choose to quit the firm or, if the contract allows, the investor may fire the agent. In either case, the assets of the firm can be liquidated at a price of $ L t ≥ 0, and the agent receives a payoff of $ R t ≥ 0 representing the agent's outside option. The liquidation value and the agent's reservation value could be stochastic (in which case interpret $ L t and $ R t as expected values) but in this case, as with the cash flows, we assume that there is no learning about their values prior to their realization. After termination, the cash flows from the project cease, so that Y s = 0 for s > t.
The threat that the agent might lose control of the project will be what induces the agent to pay back the investor. Though the agent's threat to quit the firm will limit the amount the investor can demand. Later we will show how ˆ( ,) tt LR may be endogenously determined based on the investor's ability to hire a new manager to run the firm, and the agent's ability to raise capital and start a new firm. For now, it is convenient to think of ˆ( ,) tt LR as exogenous parameters. Since the assets can always be stored prior to liquidation and the agent can always wait for the best outside option, we define
as the realized liquidation and reservation values accounting for the optimal timing decision.
The cash flows Y t that the agent receives cannot be observed or collected by the investor. However, liquidation of the business assets is observable and can be contracted on. In particular, the division of the proceeds L t can be contractually specified. This modeling reflects the idea that the agent can steal the profits but he cannot steal the assets. Alternatively, if upon termination the agent could steal some of the assets too, then interpret R t as including the value of the assets that the agent steals and interpret L t as the value of the remaining assets.
Suppose the investor funds the agent. Because of the above restrictions, a contract between the two cannot mandate payments from the agent to the investor, since the agent's resources are not observable. 4 A contract can only specify payments made from the investor to the agent as a function of past payments made and messages sent by the agent to the investor. The contract can also specify circumstances under which control of the project passes from the agent to the investor, who may then terminate the project.
Thus, we can describe the timing as follows. Each period, the agent receives a cash flow Y t . Then the agent makes a payment d t ≥ 0 and report m t to the investor. The "message space" or domain of m t is arbitrary, and we assume it is sufficiently large so as not to constrain communication between the parties. After making the payment d t to the investor, the agent receives a payment w t from the investor. The agent then chooses a quantity c t ≥ 0 to consume. The investor does not observe this consumption. Any remaining cash balance accumulates at the continuously compounded return ρ ≤ r (all positive NPV investments are already included in the project). It may be that ρ < r if it is costly to save funds in a form which is not observable and collectible. Finally, before the next period cash flow, the investor may terminate the project, if the contract allows. If the investor does not terminate the project, then the agent may choose to continue (q t = 0) or quit (q t = 1) the firm.
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Let h t = (d s , m s , ω s ) s≤t denote the history of agent payments and reports up to t, together with the indicator ω s indicating whether the project is active (ω s = 0) or has been terminated by the investor (ω s = 1) or terminated by the agent (ω s = 2) prior to s. The contract then specifies the payment made from the investor to the agent given the history of reports on date t, denoted by the function w t (h t ) ≥ 0. In addition, the contract also specifies the circumstances under which the project is terminated and the assets are sold. Let p t (h t ) denote the contractually specified probability that the project is terminated at date t ≥ 0, specified as a function of the history of reports.
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In period 0, the investor initially commits I to start the project. Otherwise the timing is identical, where as stated earlier we interpret Y 0 as the agent's initial wealth. In addition, liquidation in period 0 is interpreted as not starting the project, so $ L I 0 = . Note that this specification allows for a random determination of whether to start the project, p 0 (h 0 ), depending on the agent's initial contribution, and allows for the investor to give the agent some amount w 0 for immediate consumption.
In what follows, we will consider two contractual environments. In the first, the contract signed at date 0 rema ins in force for the life of the project. In the second, at any time during the life of the project, the contract can be renegotiated and replaced with a new contract if both parties agree to do so.
An Illustration of Optimal Security Design
We will preview our results on security design with an illustrative example. Consider a project that generates perpetual risky cash flows that are i.i.d., uniformly distributed on {0,1,2,…20}. The agent has no initial capital (Y 0 = 0) and a reservation wage R t = 0. The riskless rate of interest is 10% (r = 9.53%, continuously compounded) and the agent's subjective discount rate for consumption is 10.5% (γ = 9.98%). Since γ > r, agent would like to raise funds to finance current consumption as well as to finance the initial investment I required to start the business. Assume that the financial market is competitive so that in initially financing the project, the investors break even and the agent captures all of the rents.
Given the expected cash flow of 10 per period, in a perfect capital market the agent would be able to raise funds of 10/10% = 100. The agent would invest I, immediately consume 100 -I, and give the investor all of the business cash flow (of course, if I > 100, the project is not worth funding). For instance, the agent sells all of the equity to the investor, pays out all future cash flow as dividends to the investor, and liquidation never occurs. Even if no external funds are required to start the project, this exceeds the value of 10/10.5% = 95.24 if the agent keeps the equity himself. Now introduce the agent's incentive problem: the agent privately observes the realization of each period's cash flow and the agent can divert the cash flow for his own consumption. The above financial arrangement will fail. The agent will report a cash flow of 0 every period keeping all of the cash flow for himself, and the investor will receive no dividends. To induce the agent to pay the investor, there must be a threat that the investor will take control of the business. For this example, we assume that the investor can sell the assets to a new agent. There are many competing potential new agents, each identical to the original agent; in particular, they have no wealth and must borrow to finance the purchase. Thus, in this example, the "liquidation value" of the project, L t , is determined endogenously based on the amount the new agent can borrow using an optimal contract (which must solve the same incentive problem).
In this setting, we ask: (i) what is the best contract that the agent can offer the investor, (ii) what is the maximal funding the agent can raise, and (iii) under what circumstances do investors seize the assets and sell them to a new agent?
Given the history of payments and reported cash flows, h t , a contract specifies the payment made from the investor to the agent, w t (h t ) and it specifies the probability that the assets are seized, p t (h t ). Our analysis derives the optimal contract (w, p) and then shows that the optimal contract can be implemented with a combination of two standard securities, coupon debt and a line of credit.
Based on our analysis, in this example, the best the agent can do is raise 84. Because of the incentive problem, if 84 < I ≤ 100, a positive NPV project is not financed. The optimal contract can be implemented with perpetual coupon debt with a periodic coupon of 6.45 and a line of credit with a limit of 24.77 and an interest rate of 10.5%. If a coupon payment is missed or the accumulation of interest on the credit line would put the agent over the limit, then the agent is in default. If the agent is in default, the unmade payments "convert" to control rights according to a notional value of equity of 9.05. That is, if the agent defaults on payments totaling z, then the investor liquidates with probability z/9.05.
Depending on I, the agent may be able to finance some immediate consumption. Specifically, if I < 64.40, then the agent receives 64.40 -I for immediate consumption. If I ≥ 64.40, then no funding for immediate consumption is provided, and the agent takes an initial draw on the credit line to finance the project.
To illustrate the contract, consider the example of the cash flow history in the following table below, for the case I ≤ 64.40.
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A coupon payment of 6.45 is due in period 1. With a cash flow of 5, the agent must draw 1.45 on the line of credit to pay the coupon. In period 2, another coupon of 6.45 is due and with interest, the credit line is up to 1.45×1.105 = 1.60. Since the cash flow is 10, the agent pays the coupon, pays down the credit line, and retains a dividend of 1.95. In period 3, the cash flow of 12 is enough to pay the coupon and the agent retains a dividend of 5.55. The cash flow is 0 in periods 4-6 and so the agent keeps drawing on the credit line. In period 7, another coupon is due and with interest, the credit line is up to 23.71. To stay out of default a cash flow of at least 6.45 + 23.71 -24.77 = 5.39 is required. Given a cash flow of 2, the agent is in default on payments totaling 3.39 and the investor is given control rights worth 3.39. That is, given the contractually specified notional value of equity of 9.05, the investor is allowed to take control with probability 3.39/9.05 = 37.5%. Suppose the agent maintains control. In period 8, interest puts the credit line up to 24.77×1.105 = 27.37, which again would put the agent over the credit limit. To stay out of default a cash flow of at least 6.45 + 27.37 -24.77 = 9.05 is required. With a cash flow of 0 in period 8, the agent is now in default on payments totaling 9.05 and the investor takes control with probability 9.05/9.05 = 100%. Upon taking control, the investor sells the assets to a new agent for 84 (the maximum amount that the new agent can finance facing the same problem), and the original agent receives 0.
One can calculate that the agent's expected utility from the dividends under the above contract is 33.82. Combined with the initial cash out of 64.40 − I, the agent's total utility is 98.22 − I. Thus, the inefficiency caused by the incentive constraints reduces the agent's utility in this case by 100 − 98.22 = 1.78. This amount corresponds to the loss due to the delay in the payments to the agent, plus the expected rents of agents who acquire the firm after the initial agent loses control.
The analysis in the paper will demonstrate not only that the above contract provides the agent with the incentive to make the required payments, but also that it is the best possible contract given the incentive constraints. As an illustration that the above contract does provide adequate incentives for the agent, consider the following deviation by the agent: consume all cash flows from the project and any available credit 7 If I > 64.40 the contract is the same. The only difference is that, as described above, the agent will begin with a draw on the credit line. immediately. This gives the agent an expected cash flow from the project of 10, plus the full amount of the credit line, 24.77, in period 1. The agent defaults on the coupon of 6.45, and so retains the firm in period 2 with probability 1−6.45/9.05 = 28.73%, again receiving an expected cash flow of 10. The investor seizes the firm at the end of period 2, since the agent is now in default by 24.77×10.5% + 6.45 = 9.05. Thus, the agent's expected utility from this deviation is 2 1024.7710 28.73%33.82 1.1051.105
and therefore there is no gain. In fact, any deviation such that the agent only defaults after completely drawing down the credit line will yield this same expected utility.
In general, coupon debt and a credit line implement the optimal contract. The key property of this combination of securities is that they induce three regions for the contract. If cash flows are high, the agent is provided with current consumption and faces no control threat. This corresponds to the situation in which the age nt has no balance on the credit line. With intermediate cash flows, the agent is provided with no current consumption but still faces no control threat. This corresponds to the situation in which the agent has a balance on the credit line but is below the limit. If cash flows are low, the agent is provided with no current consumption and faces a probability of losing control. This corresponds to the situation in which the agent is in default.
Optimal Contract Design
In this section, we outline a methodology for solving for an optimal contract. We begin with the case in which renegotiation of the contract is not possible and T is finite.
Given a contract σ = (w, p), the agent will adopt an optimal strategy α = (d, m, c, q) , where the payment, report, consumption and quit decision at date t are functions of the history of cash flow realizations y t = (y s ) s≤t , and the termination history ω
When choosing an optimal strategy, the agent must respect his resource constraints; that is, he can never pay or consume more than his available cash. We denote by K t the agent's cash balance at the start of period t, given by
Let τ be the (random) date at which liquidation occurs. The agent will choose the strategy optimally to maximize the payoff:
subject to the resource constraints,
Since the contractual response to his decisions is fixed, this is essentially a single-agent decision problem, which is why the strategy can be written as a function of (y t , ω t ) alone. 9 In this formulation, we have treated the payoff R t as a utility payoff rather than a cash payment which is then consumed. This is for notational convenience only − none of the analysis would change if it were a direct cash payment.
Given the agent's strategy, the investor's payoff is then
where τ is the (random) date at which liquidation occurs.
We are interested in solving for an optimal contract which maximizes the investor's payoff subject to the agent receive a given payoff level. The choice amo ng such optimal contracts is then determined by the relative market power of the parties.
Before developing the model further, note that by using a Revelation Principle-type argument, we can establish that private saving by the agent is not necessary in an efficient contract, and that messages are extraneous.
PROPOSITION 1.
Given any contract σ with optimal strategy α = (d, m, c, q) for the agent, there exists a contract σ * and optimal strategy α *
Under the contract σ * , K t = 0 for all t.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
This result suggests the following approach to determining an optimal contract. First, we derive an optimal contract assuming private saving is impossible and no messages can be sent. We know from Proposition 1 that this contract is as good as the true optimal contract, though it might be better since the incentive constraints related to private savings have been ignored and need not be satisfied. If, however, they are satisfied at the solution (as we will show is the case), then we have a solution to the original contracting problem.
The Problem Without Private Saving
Thus, we now consider the simplified problem in which the agent's only choice variables are (d t , q t ), the payment and quit decisions made on date t. The payoffs in this problem are given by
where the contract σ = (w, p) depends only on the history of payments d t and whether the project has terminated. We seek to identify the best possible contract for the investor given any payoff for the agent. That is, we need to solve
We call a contract and payment strategy (d, q, σ) optimal if it solves the above.
We solve for an optimal contract using a dynamic programming approach. Consider the subgame that begins at the end of period s, but before the period s termination decision is made. Since there is no savings, past history does not affect the continuation possibilities for an active project. That is, any contract after any history will determine a pair of continuation payoffs
By varying the contract σ and optimal response (d, q), (a s , b s ) can be chosen from a set β s that is independent of the history y s .
Next note that for an optimal contract, only those points in β s should be chosen which are efficient for the investor. That is, holding the agent's continuation payoff a s fixed, an optimal contract will give the investor the highest possible payoff b s available in the set β s .
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That is, the set of continuation payoffs that can be used by an optimal contract on the subgame s can be described by the function
We can now solve for b s using dynamic programming. 11 First suppose the project has a finite economic life T, so that it would be optimal, absent incentive problems, to terminate on date T. In particular, suppose that T is the first date such that 
Thus, an optimal contract will lead to termination by date T. 12 After T, any payments to the agent must come from the investor. Since γ ≥ r, it is efficient to make any such payments in the next period T + . Thus, we have ( )
In general, suppose that we have a continuation function b t with the following properties:
1. b t is defined for a ≥ a 0 t ≥ 0, 2. b t is concave; that is, b′ t is weakly decreasing. 13 We now proceed to derive b s for s < t and show that it inherits the above properties. The figure above depicts the timing assumption for the continuation function b t . Given b t , we first solve for the optimal payments d t and w t , which leads to the continuation function b 1 t . Taking expectations and discounting we will then calculate the continuation function ˆs b . Finally, analyzing the period s termination and quit decisions allows us to derive b s .
Consider the problem faced by the agent at the start of period t, after realizing the cash flow y t . The agent must then choose a payment d t to make. Based on d t , according to the contract the agent will receive a payment w t from the investor and a continuation payoff a t in the remainder of the game. Thus, the agent must solve
The solution to (4) implies an optimal payment for the agent of
based on the contract's specification of w t and a t . Consider the modified contract with ˆt
which is solved with d = y t , and all payoffs are unchanged. Thus, we can without loss of generality restrict attention to contracts for which d t (y t ) = y t .
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The incentive compatibility condition is that 13 Strictly speaking, b s may not be differentiable on a set of measure 0. At these points, we interpret b′ s as an arbitrary selection from the super-gradients of b s . 
is weakly increasing in y. Note also that G t (0) ≥ a 0 t , the minimum possible continuation payoff for the agent.
Thus, the agent's payoff is given by y t + G(y t ), where G t has the properties noted above and is determined by the contract. To find the optimal contract, we must consider the payoff to the investor. The investor receives y t − w t (y t ) + b t (a t (y t )) = y t − w t (y t ) + b t ( y t + G t (y t ) − w t (y t )).
Holding G t constant, the agent's payoff is not altered by changes to w t . Thus, w t will be chosen to maximize the payoff to the investor. That is, the optimal contract will choose w t to solve
This is solved with
where
Finally, we consider the optimal function G t . From the above, the ex-ante expected payoff for the agent and the investor before Y t is realized is given by
Agent:
fixed, there is no change to the agent's payoff. Thus, the form of the function G t should be chosen to maximize the investor's expected payoff given the constraints that its mean is g t and it is weakly increasing (the incentive compatibility requirement noted previously). We have the following result:
and G weakly increasing.
Note that F is concave in z. Thus,
where F′(z) is a super-gradient 16 of F at z. Hence,
By concavity, F′ is decreasing in Y t , and from incentive compatibility, G is weakly increasing in Y t . Hence the covariance is weakly negative and the result follows. w Thus, the agent's payment and consumption has the form w t (y t ) = (y t + g t − a
; that is, the agent consumes cash flows in excess of a 1 t − g t . This is equivalent to the agent having a fixed "debt" obligation of a 1 t − g t in period t, which is an interpretation we shall make explicit in the next section.
Before proceeding further, Proposition 2 also allows us to establish that our restriction on saving is not binding: PROPOSITION 3. In the optimal contract without private saving, the agent has no incentive to choose K t > 0. This contract is therefore also optimal when private saving is possible.
PROOF:
From the above analysis, the agent's continuation payoff given cash y t in period t is equal to y t + g t . Thus, ∂/∂K t (Agent's Payoff in Period t ) = 1. Consider the age nt's option to consume less and save in period s < t in order to pay more in period t. The marginal payoff associated with this is − e − 1) ≤ 0, since ρ ≤ γ. Note that for this result to hold it is critical that G t is not increasing. The final conclusion then follows from the discussion following Proposition 1. w
Optimal Continuation Function
Having shown that saving can be ignored, we now continue solving for the opti mal mechanism by characterizing the continuation function for the period s prior to t.
The form of the investor's payoff in period t derived above is somewhat complicated. To simplify it, we introduce the following to represent the continuation payoffs just prior to the transfers in period t 
Note that b 1 t is concave since b t is. Given this representation, the expected payoff of the investor at the start of period t can be written
Define t − ≡ max{ t′ ∈ T : t′ < t}, so that t − is the period prior to t in T. Similarly define t + as the period following t, so that t
Let s = t − and now consider b s . The present value of the expected payoffs above in period s is given by
Investor: e −r(t−s) ( )
Thus, by varying g t ≥ a 0 t (the lower bound derived above), we can trace out the frontier of available payoffs from the perspective of period s. In particular, the lowest payoff for the agent is given by 
The above gives the continuation possibilities as of the end of period s if the project is not terminated. 
Then if a ∈ [R s , a L s ), stochastic termination is optimal for the investor. In that case, the investor terminates the project with probability
Adjusting for termination, this leads to a representation for the continuation frontier in period s, which we summarize below: 
where 
( ) 
Note finally that b s is concave.
PROOF:
Follows from the preceding analysis. w
Renegotiating the Contract
In the analysis above, we assumed that the agent and investor can commit to a contract for the life of the project. We now consider the possibility that they cannot commit not to renegotiate the contract, and show its effect on the possible continuation payoffs in the optimal mechanism.
Consider the continuation payoff function b t , which represents, for a given payoff of the agent, the highest payoff the investor can achieve just prior to the quit and termination decisions in period t. Suppose that for some a % > a, b t ( a % ) > b t (a); i.e., suppose (a, b t (a)) is Pareto inferior to ( a % , b t ( a % )). Then it seems natural to suppose that if the contract were to specify the continuation path associated with (a, b t (a)), the agent and investor would renegotiate the contract in favor of some mutually preferable path. If so, the continuation (a, b t (a)) is infeasible.
Indeed, such renegotiation would likely be possible. It would be difficult for the parties to commit not to act in their mutual self interest. In fact, courts in the United States will not enforce contractual provisions against renegotiation. This places restrictions on what can be achieved by an optimal contract and represents a form of contract incompleteness.
Since there is full-information about the set of possible continuation payoffs, any bargaining game played in renegotiation will select some division of the surplus corresponding to a point on the Pareto frontier of the possible continuation payoffs. This amounts to a restriction that in equilibrium the continuation paths taken are always Pareto efficient. We can impose this restriction on the contract itself -the contract must only specify efficient continuation paths. Such a contract is renegotiation-proof in the sense that at no point is there an alternative contract which both parties would mutually prefer. The result that renegotiation-proofness is equivalent to the contract being sequentially undominated (in terms of parties payoffs) was first shown by Hart and Tirole (1988) .
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In terms of our model, the restriction that b t be Pareto efficient is equivalent to b′ t (a) ≤ 0 for a ≥ a 0 t . Note that, from (15) and (17) Bernheim and Ray (1989) . 18 Hart and Moore (1994, 1998) , Hart (1995) and Bulow and Rogoff (1989) do not use this approach. They assume that one party can invoke renegotiation to a new point on the Pareto Frontier unilaterally (see, e.g., Hart and Moore (1998) page 20) . This is a restriction on the power of contracts, as courts will enforce the original contract unless both parties agree to the change. As an example, suppose a contract leads to payoffs (6,4). Suppose party 2 can threaten an action that will lead to outcomes (0,0). These papers assume that this threat will provoke renegotiation to a new outcome such as (5,5). Since the original threat is not credible, however, party 1 should not agree to renegotiate and instead enforce (6,4).
effect of renegotiation will only be to limit the circumstances in which the project is terminated. 
together with (13) 
Initial Payoffs & Project Horizon
Given the continuation function b 0 available at the end of period 0, we can now derive the agent's initial payoff as a function of his wealth Y 0 . We explicitly consider both the case in which investors compete to lend to a monopolistic agent, and the converse. Intermediate cases can obviously also be considered. In most of our applications, it is most natural to consider the first case above, in which the agent seeks financing from competitive investors. Note that in this case, if I < 11 00 () ba , then w 0 > 0 and the agent pulls cash out of the firm at date 0.
Even if investors compete initially, the second case in which the investor is a monopolist becomes relevant if the assets themselves are the unique resource. Initially, the agent owns the resource and seeks outside financing from investors. However, if the project is terminated and the investor takes control of the assets, in liquidation the investor will seek a new agent to run the firm. Thus, the liquidation payoff will be determined as in the second case. We discuss this further in Section 6.
One source of inefficiency introduced by the incentive problems is that the project may not attract initial financing. This occurs if 1** 0 () ba < I − Y 0 . Another inefficiency may be that the project is terminated prior to the first-best horizon T. Below we consider the project horizon under the optimal contract. 
Interpretation and Implementation
The optimal mechanism defined above has the following features. , then the agent faces a probability of termination. In this section we describe how the optimal mechanism can be implemented using standard contracts.
First we define two types of contracts:
LONG TERM DEBT: A long term debt contract is characterized by a sequence of fixed payments x t . If a payment is not made, the agent is in default.
CREDIT LINE:
A credit line is characterized by a pre-determined interest rate r and credit limit c L t ≥ 0. The agent can draw down the credit line, up to the credit limit, at any time. No payments need be made on the credit line unless the current outstanding balance (including accrued interest) exceeds the credit limit. If this excess is not paid, the agent is in default.
DEFAULT: Given default on payments totaling z > 0 in period t, the unmade payments "convert" to control rights according to a contract-specified notional value N t of the equity. That is, instead of receiving z the investor takes control with probability p t (z) = z / N t , keeping the proceeds L t .
We have the following characterization of the optimal contract: PROPOSITION 8. The optimal contract is implemented by a combination of a long-term debt contract and a credit line. For 0 < t ≤ T * and s = t − (the period prior to t), the long-term debt contract is defined by
The agent's initial debt obligation at date 0 is equal to x 0 = a 1 0 − g 0 , and in the final period, x T * = 0.
The credit line interest rate is r =γ, and the credit limit for t < T * is given by
If the credit limit is exceeded by z t in period t, the project is terminated with probability 
where the last inequality follows since a 0 t ≥ R t . Next we show that the consumption and termination profiles coincide for the debt contract above and the optimal contract σ. Suppose the agent begins period s with outstanding debt D s on the credit line. Given a required coupon payment of x s , the total debt is D s + x s . We show that this corresponds to g s = a in period s after paying off all debt, which is identical to the payment under σ as in (5) above. The agent then earns
s , then a s = y s + g s and the optimal contract σ terminates with probability
This corresponds with the termination probability specified by the credit line contract. Note also that if there is renegotiation and l s > 0, then a 
so that the agent enters the next period with
On the other hand, under the debt contract above, the agent begins next period with debt
Thus, To understand better the role of each type of contract, we consider some special cases. First, we show that the long-term debt contract is designed to accommodate the agent's impatience given γ > r. By committing to future payments, the agent can pay less now, or even take cash out of the firm. To see this, we show that when γ = r, the long-term debt contract is unnecessary.
First define the following,
the remaining value of the project if consumed exclusively by the agent. In general, we expect that the long-term debt contract will specify a payment x t ≥ 0. In some circumstances, however, it is possible that x t < 0; that is, the agent receives a payment rather than making one. As the proposition below shows, this only happens if R t− is very large. Then x t < 0 is necessary to induce the agent to continue rather than quit the firm.
Alternatively, suppose R s > e − γ(t−s)
The last result of the proposition can be interpreted as follows. The condition, R t ≤ V t , is that the agent would not choose to terminate the project early if he could consume all of the cash flows. That is, the agent and the investor do not disagree about the optimal maturity of the project. In that case, the remaining long-term debt payments are a net liability for the agent. Thus, any x t < 0 can be interpreted as the proceeds of a new debt issue.
In Proposition 9 above we established that the role of the long-term debt contract is to allow the agent to draw cash from the firm given γ > r. Next we show that the role of the credit line is to allow for flexibility given the uncertainty of the cash flows. We show this by demonstrating that as the cash flows become certain, the credit line disappears.
PROPOSITION 12.
Suppose that there is no renegotiation, or that termination is efficient, and that for
with equality if (24) holds.
PROOF:
See the Appendix.
Termination Payoffs
In this section we discuss a number of possible interpretations for the liquidation payoffs (R t , L t ) and their implications.
One obvious interpretation for L t is as an exogenous liquidation value based on the value of the assets in some alternative use. Suppose there is an alternative use which generates observable cash flows with expected value ν t < µ t each period. Then it is natural to define
That is, when the project is terminated, the assets are sold for use in the alternative technology. The agent is dismissed, and earns a reservation utility which it is convenient to assume is constant and normalized to zero; i.e, R s = 0.
Another important interpretation of this formulation is when the project requires ongoing investment. That is, suppose that an initial investment ν 0 is required to start the firm, and that each period, an investment of ν t is required to keep the firm in operation. Then,
is the initial capital the investor must set aside to finance the future operations. In any period s, however, the investor can "pull the plug" and thereby recover L s .
This formulation can also be equivalently interpreted as follows. Suppose that there is a monitoring technology that can be introduced to monitor the cash flows generated by the firm. Monitoring is costly, and reduces the cash flows each period by µ t − ν t . Once cash flows are monitored, the agent is paid the reservation wage, as there is no longer an incentive problem.
In the above cases, the liquidation value is exogenous. An example of an endogenous liquidation value is given by the following. Suppose that upon termination and seizure of the assets, the investor can hire an equivalent, new agent to replace the old. The old agent is dismissed, and receives the reservation utility of 0.
Assume the pool of available new agents is competitive. Then when hiring the new agent, the investor can offer the agent the contract that yields the highest possible continuation utility for the investor. That is,
Note that under this specification, termination is always renegotiation-proof. This leads to the following simplification of the characterization of the optimal mechanism in Section 4. (13) - (17).
Obvious variations on the above can be considered. For example, each period the investor may have the option of either monitoring or firing and replacing the agent. In that case,
where t = s
Another variation is to suppose that there are costs associated with hiring a new agent, and to allow for the possibility that the new agent may have capital to contribute to the project. Let ∆ 
where the constraint a ≥ k + ∆ a s is required for the new agent to be willing to join and contribute capital k.
In the case in which there are no switching costs and new agents have sufficient capital, there is an obvious solution -simply rent the assets to a new agent each period. This is formalized below: . If k s is inadequate, or if there are positive switching costs, the first best is not obtained unless γ = r and I = 0.
PROOF:
See the Appendix. Now we turn our attention to cases in which R s is non-trivial. For example, suppose that the agent has some unique talent which can be applied in another activity in which cash flows are observable. This would lead to the exogenous specification:
Generally, we would suppose η t ≤ µ t (the alternative activities is the second best use of the specific talents), so that (24) holds. Indeed, we would also expect η t + ν t ≤ µ t .
In the special case in which production in termination is efficient (i.e., when η t + ν t ≥ µ t ), we can characterize completely the solution. Note that termination is not efficient in this case if γ > r. Nevertheless, as we now show, the optimal contract can do no better.
PROPOSITION 15. Suppose (30) holds and η t + ν t ≥ µ t for all t. Then it is optimal to terminate the project each period. Thus, the agent's initial borrowing capacity is L 0 . In fact a necessary and sufficient condition for this result is
As an immediate application of Proposition 15, consider the model of sovereign debt of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) . In that model, a consortium of banks (the investor) lend to an LDC (the agent). If the LDC defaults, it is possible for the banks to monitor the LDC's exports Y t and seize up to some fraction β of them. To prevent seizure, the LDC is willing to pay β Y t each period to the banks. Thus, seizure represents a type of "monitoring" technology in which there is an upper bound on the amount the agent can be forced to repay. The natural question then is whether a contract can be used to achieve superior results than continuous monitoring with the threat of seizure. Proposition 15 shows that since monitoring/seizure can be implemented without destroying cash flows, there is no superior contract. In fact, the result holds as long as the monitoring/seizure costs are small enough relative to β and the relative impatience of the LDC. If these costs are large, then an optimal contract can be used to save monitoring costs.
Another example in which R s is non-trivial is when it is the agent's human capital that is the scarce resource, and the physical assets are easily replaceable. In this case, L s corresponds to the liquidation/replacement value of the assets. If the project is terminated, the agent looses control of the existing assets, but can start a new firm and continue the project with new assets. This implies that, for t = s
That is, the agent earns the highest possible payoff consistent with being able to purchase new assets by borrowing L s from a new investor. If it would not be possible for the agent to finance a new project this period, the agent's must wait until next period to attempt financing.
PROPOSITION 16.
Suppose R s is given by (31) for all s. Then the optimal contract is renegotiation-proof.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
This model is closely related to the model of Hart (1995; Chapter 5) . There, however, cash flows are deterministic so that Y t = µ t . The key emphasis of this model is the "inalienability of human capital," or the agent's right to quit. Here we model that by assuming the agent can quit and start a new firm if new capital can be raised to purchase equivalent assets for price L s . 21 The difference between our model and Hart (1995) is the following. Since we assume that asset purchases are observable, if the agent quits and starts a new firm in period s, the entire amount L s must be financed externally. Any funds contributed by the agent could be seized by the creditors of the initial firm. Hart (1995) instead has a specification which is equivalent to assuming that the agent can contribute capital to start the new firm. This is best illustrated by an example. Suppose Y t = µ t = 10, ν t = 6, T = 6, r = 0 and γ is very close to zero, but positive. 22 Since there is no uncertainty, from Proposition 12 the credit line is zero. The chart below calculates the optimal long-term debt contract x t , as well as the payments from Hart (1995) . To fund the project at date 0, the agent must invest 30 to buy the initial assets. Under our solution, the agent can borrow 28 and so must contribute 2. Under Hart (1995) , the entrepreneur can borrow at most 24 and so must contribute 6.
To understand the difference, consider the payment in period 4. Here, x 4 = 10 since the agent is threatened with losing the project in period 5, which is worth 10. The agent would prefer to pay 6 to buy new assets, but these assets will be seized by the initial creditors. The agent cannot externally finance the new assets for 6, since the agent cannot commit to repay any loan in period 5. This differs from Hart (1995) , since there the agent will never pay more than the current value of the assets.
In period 3, x 3 = 8. Note that the threat of termination could induce the agent to pay up to 10. However, x 3 + x 4 cannot exceed 18 since otherwise at the end of period 2 the agent would quit and start a new firm by raising 18 and promising 8+10 to the new creditor. This also implies x 2 = 0, since if x 2 > 0 the agent will again default, consume x 2 and start a new firm. This cycle then repeats as more periods are added to the model.
The above example highlights the distinction between our model and Hart (1995) . Since creditors can seize new assets, our contracts leads to superior outcomes. Of course, our model also generalizes to the case of uncertain cash flows and different discount rates.
Another variation of our model subsumes the model of Gromb (1999) . Gromb considers an environment in which participation of both the investor and the agent are necessary (neither party has an outside option). There is a sequence of available positive NPV projects. The project in period t requires investment ν t and produces cash flows Y t .
(Gromb restricts this further by assuming stationarity and Y t binary.) Each period a decision must be made whether to finance the current project, or whether to "mothball" and remain idle.
Absent renegotiation, Gromb's model coincides with that discussed in (26) above, since the investor can commit to permanent liquidation and refuse to finance any future projects (which Gromb shows is optimal).
With renegotiation, this environment can be modeled with L s as in (28) 
that is, the investor gets the highest possible continuation payoff with the agent employed, or mothballs and recovers ν t . Correspondingly, the agent only earns rents when the project is not mothballed.
Asset Substitution and Agency
The previous section investigated observable investment decisions. In this section consider briefly some of the consequences of unobserved investment decisions by the agent.
First we consider a pure form of the asset substitution problem; namely, that the agent can influence the riskiness of future cash flows, but not their mean. Specifically, suppose on date s, the agent can choose a parameter φ s such that for t > s,
Of course, other moments of the distribution of the cash flows are potentially affected by φ s , so that for example Var( Y t | φ s ) need not be constant in φ s .
Generally speaking, most models of debt contracts have the consequence that the agent has an incentive to increase the riskiness of cash flows (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ).
This results in a transfer of wealth from debt holders to the agent as the residual claimant or equity holder. This problem is only avoided if debt is riskless. Since debt is risky in our model, one might expect to find this same incentive for asset substitution. Interestingly, this is not the case as shown below.
PROPOSITION 17.
Under the optimal contract of Section 4, the agent is indifferent with respect to the choice of the pure asset substitution parameter φ s satisfying (32). Thus, the agent can be assumed to choose φ s optimally for the investor, which implies the elimination of any mean-preserving spreads. Thus, the contract of Section 4 remains optimal.
The intuition for the above result is the following. Increasing risk generally benefits equity holders since they participate in the gains, but only partially in the losses. In our model, incentive compatibility requires that the agent pay for losses through forfeiture of control of the assets. Thus there is no gain for the agent from increasing risk. There is a loss for the debt holders, however, since generally there may be dead weight costs associated with seizing the assets and terminating the project (i.e., the full information value of the project exceeds R t + L t ). 
Note that this effort choice is identical to optimal choice in a first-best world with complete contracts and symmetric information. However, though effort is first best under the contract derived in section 4, the contract of section 4 is no longer optimal. To see why, note that the investor's payoff is also increasing in the project's output. This externality is not included in problem (33). That is, in this second best world, the optimal effort level generally exceeds the first best level. 24 Intuitively, high output allows the 23 This same argument holds in other models in which incentives are provided strictly through nonpecuniary penalties, as introduced by Diamond (1984) . 24 To be precise, it will always exceed the first best level if effort increases output in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance, and if the first best effort is interior. On the other hand, if effort also increases risk, then it is possible that optimal effort is below the first best level.
parties to avoid inefficient termination (which is not a problem in a first best world). An optimal contract will induce higher effort by rewarding high output.
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There is one special case in which the contract of this paper is optimal even when the agent takes an unobserved effort decision. This occurs if the first best level of effort is already the highest level of effort possible. While such a corner solution is unlikely in the general case, it is common in models with binary (high/low) effort choices. PROOF: See the Appendix.
The above analysis considered contemporaneous effort; i.e., effort that affects current output. If effort also affects future output, then the contract of section 4 no longer induces the first best effort level. There are two reasons for this. First, the agent discounts future cash flows at rate γ > r. Second, there is a positive probability in general that the agent will be terminated prior to receiving the benefit of the effort.
Concluding Remarks
We have assumed that the project is run at a fixed scale. In DeMarzo and Fishman (2001) we extend the analysis to cover more general agency problems and we allow the scale to be determined as part of the optimal contract. A key result here is that even though the profitability of current investment is independent of the profitability of past investme nt, the optimal contract entails more current investment if the past business cash flows are high. Like the threat of a transfer of control, the promise of funding for new investment can be used to induce the agent to pay the investor. This result matches the empirical finding that, after controlling for investment opportunities, firms' investment decisions are positively correlated with cash flow; see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) . Moreover our model also matches their finding that the correlation between cash flow and investment is higher for firms that are not paying dividends. We also show that investment will be positively serially correlated over time.
To be completed. 25 In terms of the notation of section 4, an optimal contract in the presence of moral hazard will use a function G s (Y s ) that is increasing rather than constant to induce effort that exceeds the first best. Note that rewarding the agent in this way is costly due to the concavity of the investor's continuation function b. Thus, G must be chosen to balance incentives and risk. We plan to explore this problem further in future work.
Finally, we need to show that B * (α | σ) ≤ B * (α * | σ * ). To see this, note that for any contract and strategy of the agent, the feasibility constraints plus the fact that ρ ≤ r implies that
(If ρ = r this holds with equality.) Since this holds with equality under the new contract, and the liquidation policy and consumption is unchanged, the result follows. w Next suppose the investor is a monopolist. Then he will choose the continuation with the highest payoff for the investor, which implies that the agent receives a * * . Thus, the agent will be willing to pay up to a * * to participate. If there is renegotiation, b′ 0 ≤ 0, so that a * * = a Recall that the agent's continuation payoff at T * is min(
PROOF
this continuation payoff is R T * . Thus from (12), p T * = 1, and termination by T * occurs under the optimal contract σ.
As γ → ∞, the agent's continuation payoff from any path goes to zero. Hence, the agent will consume all cash immediately, and cannot be induced to pay anything to the investor. The investor will therefore choose to terminate immediately (not start the project) and receive L 0 . 
We now show that a
Hence, from the definition of a Thus,
verifying the induction hypothesis. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 17:
From the analysis in section 4, the agent's continuation payoff in period t is equal to Y t + g t for some constant g t . Thus, the agent's expected payoff is unaffected by φ s . On the other hand, the investor's continuation payoff in period t is given by (see (7))
Since b 1 t is concave, the investor has an induced risk aversion regarding the cash flows of the firm. Thus, the investor will prefer that φ s be chosen to eliminate mean-preservingspreads. w PROOF OF PROPOSITION 18: Recall from section 4 that the agent's incentive compatibility constraint on reporting output implies that agent's payoff in period s is given by
where G s is weakly increasing. Given such a payoff, by FOSD and the fact that e * s = max{e∈ξ s } solves (33), the agent will choose effort e * s under any feasible contract. Thus, we can regard this effort choice as exogenous and solve for the optimal contract as in the previous analysis. w
